Vitesse Arnhem - quality

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Stevie Freestein II said:
When the allies liberated the Netherlands they wanted to avoid civilian casualties and the strong SS units on the right flank, so Montgomery ordered our tank divisions to pass de Dutchies on de left hand side.

Seriously though, it’s a lovely gesture.

Slightly off topic but I get hay fever when I watch the RAF dropping food.

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The problem was more that there was only one track through the polder between the armour's jump off point and Nijmegen/Arnhem. The minute a tank was knocked out, it held up the entire column until it could be cleared.
 
super ally said:
If only the RAF had agreed to dropping the Airborne on Arnhem...
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The problem would still have been that the drop zone was too far from the existing front line; unless everything went absolutely perfectly, it was near certain that the relieving forces wouldn't get there on time. It pretty much ignored Clausewitz's maxim that "No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy". The tragedy of Arnhem is that there was never a workable plan B once the supporting armour fell behind schedule.
 
Leeds Mackem Reborn said:
Just to check you know it was about the picture of the scarf?

There’s a bar called The Pegasus Bar in the middle of Arnhem. Pegasus is in the Para crest I think. When we were there it was run by a Mag who I believe was an ex-para himself. It has a load of history on the walls and a good selection of beers. My kind of museum!


Thanks whoever did that
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see my post #51, it was the Pegasus bar we were in. Proper spit and sawdust bar. There was a mag regular in there when we were in - didn't own the bar though?
 
bernardbresslaw said:
see my post #51, it was the Pegasus bar we were in. Proper spit and sawdust bar. There was a mag regular in there when we were in - didn't own the bar though?
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The Mag was definitely behind the bar and looked in charge when we were there. I think he’s left now. Its not a smart pub but I don’t recall it looking too rough.
 
Grumpy Old Man said:
The problem would still have been that the drop zone was too far from the existing front line; unless everything went absolutely perfectly, it was near certain that the relieving forces wouldn't get there on time. It pretty much ignored Clausewitz's maxim that "No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy". The tragedy of Arnhem is that there was never a workable plan B once the supporting armour fell behind schedule.
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Then blame the Americans for pissing about at Nijmegen. I'm not convinced by the 'all the tanks on one road' theory.
 
Can’t remember but I don’t think so. I’m pretty sure we didn’t see a barmaid. It was a quiet Saturday lunchtime when we were there. It was the dullest part of a much livelier day if I’m honest. We ended up drinking an awful lot in a techno bar with Arnhem’s nutters including a guy called Robbie who was 6ft 8 at least, a crazy accountant from Venlo, a bloke who’d driven there from Romania for a pint and Arnhem’s hooligan liaison officer. All of whom couldn’t have been nicer lads if I’m honest. We ended up being given a lift to the match in the back of a police van. It was one of the great days out.
 
super ally said:
Then blame the Americans for pissing about at Nijmegen. I'm not convinced by the 'all the tanks on one road' theory.
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The Germans had flooded the polder either side of it, and the ground was too wet to support the weight of armour, although it was just about passable by infantry. The problem, as I said, was that once those relief columns were delayed, Arnhem was literally "a bridge too far". Even in the early stages of planning, a lot of the senior officers in the airborne were sceptical about the chances of success (the Polish commander was particularly scathing) , but by then so many paratroop missions had been planned and cancelled that they were desperate for their battalions to do something. Beevor is particularly strong on this.
 
Grumpy Old Man said:
The Germans had flooded the polder either side of it, and the ground was too wet to support the weight of armour, although it was just about passable by infantry. The problem, as I said, was that once those relief columns were delayed, Arnhem was literally "a bridge too far". Even in the early stages of planning, a lot of the senior officers in the airborne were sceptical about the chances of success (the Polish commander was particularly scathing) , but by then so many paratroop missions had been planned and cancelled that they were desperate for their battalions to do something. Beevor is particularly strong on this.
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You seem to be thinking more about the overall failure of the mission, while I am looking at the disaster that befell the Airborne troops at Arnhem in particular and the possible success of Market Garden as an afterthought.

You're giving the impression that the 1st Airborne were a hopeless distance from 30th Corps, but elements of 30th Corps made it to Driel...if 1st Airborne had been landed in force in Arnhem and south of the river then the Germans would have had a hell of a harder job picking them off than in the divided groups they found themselves, and if worst came to worst they could have left Arnhem by bridge rather than trying to cross the river. Thousands of men were captured and killed that could have been (at worst) withdrawn if only they had been deployed correctly in the first place.
 
super ally said:
You seem to be thinking more about the overall failure of the mission, while I am looking at the disaster that befell the Airborne troops at Arnhem in particular and the possible success of Market Garden as an afterthought.

You're giving the impression that the 1st Airborne were a hopeless distance from 30th Corps, but elements of 30th Corps made it to Driel...if 1st Airborne had been landed in force in Arnhem and south of the river then the Germans would have had a hell of a harder job picking them off than in the divided groups they found themselves, and if worst came to worst they could have left Arnhem by bridge rather than trying to cross the river. Thousands of men were captured and killed that could have been (at worst) withdrawn if only they had been deployed correctly in the first place.
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Not hopeless, but just too far. It was a risky mission, probably unnecessarily so given the overall state of the Western Front at that time; Montgomery would have been better off securing Antwerp, and shortening the Allied supply lines. There was a heavy flak concentration over Arnhem, and the relative lack of open space was a problem for the glider borne elements in particular. There would almost certainly have been a far higher casualty rate in the initial drop. As it was, the landings progressed reasonably well until the forces had reached Arnhem. It really took until that time for the Germans to get to grips with what had happened, and organise a counterattack. The real problems were a) the lack of even a modicum of heavy weaponry in the initial drop, and b) the failure to reinforce in a timely manner. That elements of 30 Corps reached Driel didn't help; they were still too late.
 
Grumpy Old Man said:
Not hopeless, but just too far. It was a risky mission, probably unnecessarily so given the overall state of the Western Front at that time; Montgomery would have been better off securing Antwerp, and shortening the Allied supply lines. There was a heavy flak concentration over Arnhem, and the relative lack of open space was a problem for the glider borne elements in particular. There would almost certainly have been a far higher casualty rate in the initial drop. As it was, the landings progressed reasonably well until the forces had reached Arnhem. It really took until that time for the Germans to get to grips with what had happened, and organise a counterattack. The real problems were a) the lack of even a modicum of heavy weaponry in the initial drop, and b) the failure to reinforce in a timely manner. That elements of 30 Corps reached Driel didn't help; they were still too late.
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30 Corps helped 2000 of 1st Airborne escape over the river, if that''s not help I don't know what is. As for being late, they were delayed by the American failure to capture the bridge at Nijmegen, and 1st Airborne were still fighting when they got to the south bank of the river...unfortunately not at the bridges because the vast majority of them were landed 8 to 10 miles away from the target.

1st Airborne wanted to use the same glider landing zone that the Poles ended up using but were knocked back by the RAF

From what I've read, there was BELIEVED to be heavy flak in Arnhem, which was found to not be the case.
 
Those incharge also severely under estimated German strength in the area. Iirc either a SS PzGrdr regiment or SS Pz regiment were refitting just down the road. All battle hardened and beyond the capability of the lightly armed Paras in terms of anti-armour weapons. The Dutch resistance actually told the high ups about them being there but they chose to ignore it. As already mentioned the Poles were particularly annoyed at the lack of credence given to several flaws in the plans that they highlighted. A lack of sufficient aircraft to carry out the lift also made it very difficult to deploy effectively. Soldiers were being dropped in areas that the Germans had already marked and ranged into after the first wave arrived.

Sure a map or plan also fell into German hands quite early on with full operational details. Plus the radio comms didn't work......a problem that had again been highlighted to the planners.

I went to Arnhem for the pre-season (2001?) and visited Osterbeek with the cemetery. Very sobering. Not many people over 25 buried there.
 
I went to Arnhem for the pre-season (2001?) and visited Osterbeek with the cemetery. Very sobering. Not many people over 25 buried there.[/QUOTE]

That's what really struck me when looking at the graves...aged 18, aged 20, aged 21 etc, very sad. Also every 4th or 5th grave seemed to say 'Name unknown'. Very humbling experience there.
 
Leeds Mackem Reborn said:
Just to check you know it was about the picture of the scarf?

There’s a bar called The Pegasus Bar in the middle of Arnhem. Pegasus is in the Para crest I think. When we were there it was run by a Mag who I believe was an ex-para himself. It has a load of history on the walls and a good selection of beers. My kind of museum!


Thanks whoever did that
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Yes sounds like a great museum ) actually my post was about the whole post scarf included and the further link about the captain and the bond with him and the old para.
 
si73 said:
Those incharge also severely under estimated German strength in the area. Iirc either a SS PzGrdr regiment or SS Pz regiment were refitting just down the road. All battle hardened and beyond the capability of the lightly armed Paras in terms of anti-armour weapons. The Dutch resistance actually told the high ups about them being there but they chose to ignore it. As already mentioned the Poles were particularly annoyed at the lack of credence given to several flaws in the plans that they highlighted. A lack of sufficient aircraft to carry out the lift also made it very difficult to deploy effectively. Soldiers were being dropped in areas that the Germans had already marked and ranged into after the first wave arrived.

Sure a map or plan also fell into German hands quite early on with full operational details. Plus the radio comms didn't work......a problem that had again been highlighted to the planners.

I went to Arnhem for the pre-season (2001?) and visited Osterbeek with the cemetery. Very sobering. Not many people over 25 buried there.
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Sadly typical of all war cemeteries. Not been to any WW1 ones, but the scale of the American cemetery overlooking Omaha Beach (the one at the end of Saving Private Ryan) shook me up when I was there, as did the bewildering number of names on the Menin Gate in Ypres.
 
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